Peace through strength deters war, appeasement invites war, and letting an enemy build up unmolested makes wars longer, costs higher, and risks greater.
i Jinping holds the titles of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chairman of the Central Military Commission, President of China, and Core Leader of the CCP. President Donald Trump used the title “President” when meeting with Xi last week, but in reality, his CCP tittles are what matter. Xi’s title as Core Leader elevates him to dictatorial power on a scale held previously only by Mao Zedong.
The pomp and circumstance shown to President Trump was an obvious play to the American’s ego, but also a display of Great Power status on a par with, if not better than, the United States. Chinese state media, academics, and officials have long promoted narratives declaring the “rise of the East and decline of the West” and that “the Chinese model is more effective, more competitive, and superior to the American model.” Xi, in a not very subtle way, asked Trump if he had read Harvard professor Graham Allison’s 2017 book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap? This was widely reported as an effort by Xi to promote peaceful relations, but such a view is not supported by the contents of the book and why Xi likes it.
Allison’s argument is that too many wars, starting with the conflict between Athens and Sparta described by the ancient historian Thucydides, have been the result of an established power (like America today) trying to resist a rising power like China. The status quo power is cast as the aggressor. So, it is better to accommodate the challenger to keep the peace. This will take “huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions” writes Allison, including accepting that America is doomed to fall to second place behind China. It is better to lose without a fight is his decadent advice.
The passage that Xi most likes is when Allison argues that resisting China’s rise is not even possible anyway because “China has already passed the United States” in economic strength and military potential.
Yet, Allison’s own historical examples show just the opposite of his preconceived conclusion if you instead start with the record. In each of his twelve examples of modern war between a “ruling” power and a rising power, it is the rising power that starts the war with acts of aggression. In none of the cases does the ruling power act in a pre-emptive manner to push its rival down before it feels strong enough to attempt an outright seizure of power. That was their mistake. Even Allison’s core example of Sparta reacting to Athens’ rise notes that the two Greek city-states had a 30-year peace treaty during which, as Thucydides writes, Sparta did little until “the better part of Greece was already in their [Athenian] hands.” This means that the ruling powers behaved exactly as Allison wants the U.S. to do; they did nothing to protect their position. But instead of the peaceful outcome Allison desires, war was the result as inaction invited continued aggression. The rising power saw no limits. The real lesson is obvious to anyone not blinded by Allison’s leftist ideology that embraces American decline. Peace through strength deters war, appeasement invites war, and letting an enemy build up unmolested makes wars longer, costs higher, and risks greater.
China’s leaders are happy to welcome scholars like Allison for visits where they can reinforce beliefs which favor their advance. During Trump’s first term, Allison visited China and stated, “For four decades, Republican and Democratic administrations alike saw China as a ‘partner’ or ‘strategic partner.’ But the Trump administration now publicly calls China a ‘strategic rival’ or ‘adversary.’ Obama, Bush, and Clinton pursued a strategy of engaging China and welcoming its integration into the global economic and security order the United States has led for seventy years.” If read in its proper way, this statement confirms that past presidents practiced appeasement. They did not just allow but encouraged the massive transfer of capital and technology across the Pacific to empower the Beijing regime. An epic blunder in grand strategy.
Trade is at the heart of the appeasement narrative. Economic interdependence was the core of the post-Cold War euphoria; the way to keep even militant regimes like the PRC in hand. This idea comes from the classical economists of the early 19th century who tried to proclaim a similar new world order after the decades of war sparked by the French Revolution and Napoleon. Foremost among these liberal philosophers was Richard Cobden. His most famous claim was that commerce was “the grand panacea” that would remove “the motive for large and mighty empires, for gigantic armies and great fleets would die away.” It is Cobden’s naïveté that sets the real “trap” that national leaders should avoid but have too often fallen for from the advice of academic and business factions. The French economist Frederic Bastiat added that “Free trade means harmony of interests and peace between nations.” Actual history shows the contrary as control of productive assets and resources is what fuels ambition.
It is this “Cobden Trap” that should be the center of study. The thirty or more business executives President Trump took with him to China has raised concerns that a “transactional” President may forget the essentials of grand strategy which require that the U.S. back away from economic interdependence with a China that uses its control of critical minerals and industrial supply-chains as leverage to shift the balance of power in its favor, and enhances its control by stealing technology on a massive scale.
A Chinese attack on Taiwan would be the last step in a march of aggression leading to a major war. Global Times, the CCP’s main propaganda outlet, hailed Trump’s post-Xi interview with Fox News where he supposedly weakened U.S. support for Taiwan saying he doesn’t want “the U.S. to travel 9500 miles to fight a war.” But the way to prevent such a war is by deterrence, not appeasement. I have visited Taiwan several times. It is a magnificent island filled with great people who have earned their freedom. Thucydides argued that interests override morality in human nature leading to the horrors of war. But in the case of Taiwan, the strategic interests of the U.S. and its Asian allies (especially Japan) are reinforced by the moral case for Taiwan’s continued independence which it has had on a de facto basis for three generations.
The National Security Strategy, issued last November, should keep us on track. It states, “We want the world’s most robust industrial base. American national power depends on a strong industrial sector capable of meeting both peacetime and wartime production demands. That requires not only direct defense industrial production capacity but also defense-related production capacity. Cultivating American industrial strength must become the highest priority of national economic policy… We want to remain the world’s most scientifically and technologically advanced and innovative country, and to build on these strengths. And we want to protect our intellectual property from foreign theft.” These objectives cannot be met unless we break the Chinese economic grip and translate our economic strength into military power to counter Beijing’s buildup.
The good news from Allison’s work is that in most cases, the “ruling” power has been able to turn back challengers by drawing on its deeper reserves of strength. This is also true in those cases which did not result in war. Allison counts the Cold War as a success because it did not turn hot. Yet, appeasement had nothing to do with its outcome. U.S. strategy was based on containing the Soviet Union to hobble its economic development. Controls blocked technology transfers. There were “hot spots” where covert actions, proxy wars, shows of force, arms races and the support of dissidents and insurgents were used. In the end, the stronger power won. The Soviets collapsed both at home and abroad when President Ronald Reagan gave them a push.
Vladimir Putin pursues a revanchist policy, his smaller Russia is even more underdeveloped, inferior not only to the U.S. but to the EU. Indeed, the U.S.-led global alliance system unites over half of the world economy under the western banner. The challengers, whether in Beijing, Moscow or Tehran, do not have the power to prevail against such a strong coalition of advanced nations — unless Western leaders listen to defeatists like Allison. Which is why Xi wants to promote his views.
William R. Hawkins is a former economics professor who has worked for several Washington think tanks and on the staff of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. He has written widely on international economics and national security issues for both professional and popular publications including for the Army War College, the U.S. Naval Institute, and the National Defense University, among others.
THE ARTFUL DILETTANTE 