Trump may have given Iran everything it wanted on paper—but the real question is whether Tehran fell for a deal that gives America the leverage to walk away.

To evaluate the Iran Memorandum of Understanding on its merits, beyond the hype, let’s start by separating what we know from what we don’t.

Iran’s military has been destroyed. It has no air force, no navy, and no air defenses.

We have obliterated Iran’s uranium enrichment plants, its uranium mills, and its uranium hexafluoride conversion facility, as well as the secret bomb-making workshops in Parchin that Iran would never allow the IAEA to inspect.

We have destroyed most of Iran’s ability to manufacture drones and ballistic missiles.

We have shattered the Iranian economy.

We have pitted the regime against itself, as seen in recent demonstrations organized by hard-liners against the MoU.

We have also demonstrated that America has a new “special relationship”—with Israel, not Britain. We have gone to war with the IDF, flying thousands of joint air missions without a single mishap, something we could arguably not do today with our NATO allies.

These are facts, and they are major accomplishments of a military campaign that no previous American president has been willing to attempt.

But we did not defeat the Iranian regime. That, too, is a fact—one the regime reminds the U.S. of every day.

Not only do they appear to be undeterred, but they enjoy taunting us, threatening to “bloody” our noses, and deliver a “harsh blow” should we not keep up our commitments under the MoU.

But just what are the U.S. commitments?

The 14-point MoU reads like a wish list crafted in Tehran. And I suspect that is exactly what it is. (More on that below).

Over the past several weeks, I have watched with disbelief as pro-regime media in Tehran released this or that version of the accord, including what appeared to be U.S. commitments to establish a $300 billion reconstruction fund and to withdraw all U.S. military forces from the region.

Astonishingly, those measures do indeed figure in the 14-point MoU. Paragraph 6 says that the United States “undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least USD 300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Paragraph 4 states that the United States “undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal.”

These are just two of the extraordinary concessions made by Trump’s negotiating team to the Iranian regime. Other concessions include immediately releasing frozen Iranian assets, and the future removal of sanctions.

But will all of those U.S. concessions actually occur? Listening to President Trump at his G7 press conference on Thursday suggests perhaps not.

He said that if the Iranians didn’t hold up their end of the agreement—opening the Strait of Hormuz and surrendering their nuclear material—then the U.S. would return to bombing, maybe for two weeks, maybe for two years.

He also said the U.S. wasn’t putting up one cent for the reconstruction fund. Any U.S. “contribution” would come from Iranian money the U.S. has frozen and now has pledged to release.

It all raises the question whether Trump didn’t somehow snooker the Iranians.

That’s right.

From the man who said the Iranians had never won a war but never lost a negotiation, did Team Trump actually get the better of the Iranians in this deal?

He gave them all they could possibly want. But it’s not a deal. It’s an MoU.

It contains only three active pieces: an end to immediate hostilities, opening the Strait, and an undefined release of frozen Iranian assets. Everything else is to be negotiated at a later date, in principle, by August 15.

Those follow-on negotiations were supposed to have started in Geneva on Friday, June 19—the day after Trump signed the MoU publicly at the G7 conference in Evian.

But nobody came.

Ever since Jimmy Carter, U.S. presidents have bet a piece of their presidency on the quixotic notion that somehow they could offer the Iranians something so enticing they would change their behavior.

But I have long argued that this Iranian regime can never change the behavior we object to. It can never abandon its nuclear ambitions; it can never give up its terror proxies; it can never abandon the charter of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which is to spread the Islamic revolution around the globe, because these are core values of the regime.

Give up on those core values, and the regime disintegrates.

JD Vance has made clear that the goodies contained in the MoU are all “performance-based.” In other words, if the Iranians don’t deliver on their commitments—whether it’s the ceasefire itself, freedom of navigation in the Strait, or the surrender of their nuclear program—then they will not receive the benefits set forth in the MoU.

And that’s what leads me to suspect that the president may actually have snookered the Iranians.

When they see a U.S. president offering them $150 billion in sanctions relief, as Obama did, they take it to the bank. It’s not up to further negotiation; it’s a fait accompli.

But with President Trump, those bets are off. They can point to all the goodies they believe they are entitled to in the 14-point MoU, but until Trump declares that they have fulfilled their commitments, they won’t be getting them. Not a one.

So what does the MoU achieve? It settles the oil markets, it fuels the stock market, and arguably it enhances the chances of the Republicans to win the midterm elections. If it collapses on November 5 because the Iranians didn’t carry out their part of it, so be it. America will be back to war without the restraint of another election..

American Greatness