Why Did the Intel Community Leak the Dubious Jensen Huang Spy Story Instead of Warning Him

David Sacks Is Right: The Jensen Huang Leak Was a Veto on the President’s Advisers.

Jensen Huang ran Nvidia for 33 years and lost his job within a week. On October 29th, the New York Times reported that a woman with whom he had been involved, an executive at the Singapore data-center company MegaSpeed, was suspected of working for Chinese intelligence. The paper cited “people briefed on the surveillance.” On November 6th, 3 days after the midterm elections, it reported on a classified memo saying China’s Ministry of State Security had recruited her. Huang acknowledged the affair on November 8th, a second story alleging a relationship with a subordinate followed within days, and on November 12th he was out. No investigator had established that he gave up a single secret, and on November 12th the attorney general said the Justice Department had reached no conclusion as to whether the woman was a spy.

David Sacks has this right. “People who are hostile to Jensen, who were briefed on this memo, broke the law in order to leak it, in order to take him down,” he said on the All-In podcast. The hostility had a cause, and the cause was access. Huang had the president’s ear on chip sales to China and was winning the argument, and since nobody in the national-security establishment can overrule the president, officials with no authority to choose his advisers used a classified leak to make one of them politically impossible to keep.

Huang could walk into the Oval Office and make a case nobody else could make with his authority. He argued that by denying Beijing its most advanced chips and selling it older ones, licensed sales keep Chinese customers dependent on American technology and starve Huawei of the revenue it needs to catch up. President Trump heard that from the man who built the chips, and in December 2025 he approved licensed sales of the older H200 with 25% of the revenue going to the federal government. Sacks points out that the Biden and Trump administrations both drew a line between leading-edge chips and lesser models. For the officials and legislators who wanted a blanket ban, the December decision was an irritant. The access that produced it was the real problem.

Section 798 of Title 18 makes disclosing classified communications intelligence a felony punishable by up to 10 years in prison, and it carves out no exception for leakers who are sure their policy is the better one. Their lawful options are the ordinary ones. An official who thinks the president is being badly advised can write the memo, brief his principal, resign in protest, or persuade Congress to pass the ban he wants. He cannot choose the president’s advisers for him, because Article II vests the executive power in one elected man, and the power includes deciding whom he listens to. Who advises the president belongs to the president, and through him to the voters who chose him.

Christine Fang got close to Eric Swalwell when he served on the House Intelligence Committee and had access to classified material, and what Swalwell received was a defensive briefing, the standard first move when officials believe a foreign agent has gotten close to an American with sensitive knowledge. He cut off contact and kept his seat. Huang, a private citizen, received a newspaper story. On the available account, nobody ever warned him, though a quiet warning would have protected what was at risk and let him keep advising the president. The leak protected nothing and ended the advising, which tells you which result its authors valued.

The allegation is thin where it should be thick. Sacks notes that the coverage identifies no classified information Huang possessed, no secret he conveyed, and no design files that changed hands. Restricting where a commercial chip may be sold does not make its CEO a keeper of state secrets, and the engineering files that matter are hardly the kind of thing one hands over across a pillow. Sacks does not claim the memo was forged, and neither do I; a real counterintelligence concern, disclosed at its most damaging angle, does the job without a single invented fact. According to Politico, Rep. Jim Himes, the likely incoming Democrat chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, left the classified briefing unsure the woman was a spy at all and wondered aloud whether she was a “useful idiot.”

A leaker needs no power to fire anyone, and Chamath Palihapitiya supplied the mechanism. Once the spy story and the affair became public together, Nvidia’s directors had to ask what Huang had disclosed about a relationship with someone tied to a business partner, what he had told the auditors, and what liability insurance backed both questions. A board can doubt the espionage claim entirely and still feel compelled to act on the disclosure failure. The president, for his part, now pays a price every time he takes Huang’s call, because the Democrats and their willing accomplices in the drive-by media stand ready to describe each licensed sale as a favor to Beijing. The Times had first mentioned the relationship in October 2025. It acquired the authority of classified intelligence a year later, 5 days before the midterms, and the memo itself surfaced 3 days after them.

Alexander Muse, The Enterprise

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